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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A.  Basis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the District Court 
 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe No. 14 (“Jane Doe”) appeals from the Final 
Order entered on August 16, 2012, by the Honorable John F. Walter, United States 
District Court Judge for the Central District of California.  (ER 5-9).1  This action 
was brought in the district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1332(a), as it is between citizens of different states and the amount in 
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000.  
B.  The Order of the District Court is Final and Appealable 
 This Court has jurisdiction over a timely appeal from the final decision of 
the district court.  28 U.S.C. §1291.  The Order dated August 16, 2012 was a final 
decision as it dismissed the action against Defendant-Appellee Internet Brands, 
Inc. d/b/a modelmayhem.com (“Internet Brands”) in its entirety with prejudice. 
(ER 8).  See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 
1997).  
C.   The Notice of Appeal is Timely Filed 
 Jane Doe filed her Notice of Appeal on September 5, 2012, twenty (20) days 
after the Court entered its Final Order on August 16, 2012.  This appeal is therefore 
timely. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1).  
                            
1 “ER” in this Brief refers to the Appellant’s Excerpts of Record.  
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
 Whether Internet Brands is a “publisher or speaker” for purposes of 
Plaintiff’s claim, which is therefore barred under the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §230(c), where it alleges that Internet Brands negligently 
failed to warn its modelmayhem.com members that they had been targeted in a 
fraudulent rape scheme.  
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 Pursuant to 9th Cir. R. 28-2.7, a copy of the pertinent statute, 47 U.S.C. 
§230, appears in the attached Addendum.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 A.   Nature of the Case 
 This appeal concerns the scope and application of the bar on causes of action 
against internet service providers set forth in the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1).  Jane Doe alleges in her Complaint a negligent 
failure to warn claim that does not treat Internet Brands as a “publisher or 
speaker”, and is therefore not barred by the CDA. 
 This case arises from the horrific drugging and rape of Jane Doe by two 
individuals, Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum, who perpetrated a scam to rape 
women by deceit and to videotape the rape for sale as pornography.  In this 
fraudulent scheme, they targeted aspiring young female models with profiles on 
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 7 of 35
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modelmayhem.com, a website intended for marketing and networking in the 
modeling industry. Internet Brands, the owner and operator of modelmayhem.com, 
learned that Flanders and Callum were perpetrating this scheme against its 
members, and sued the persons from whom it purchased modelmayhem.com 
alleging that they failed to disclose the potential liability from civil suits due to this 
scheme.  This suit was filed before Jane Doe was targeted by Flanders and Callum 
in the rape scheme.  At the same time, Internet Brands failed to warn its members 
who were vulnerable in the scheme of a real and avoidable danger.  As a result, 
Jane Doe, a young aspiring model with a modelmayhem.com profile, was unaware 
of the danger posed by Flanders and Callum, and was subsequently deceived in the 
scam and raped in the making of a pornographic video.  
 B.   Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
 Jane Doe filed her Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California on April 26, 2012. (ER 10).  The Complaint alleged a single 
cause of action for negligence.  Defendant Internet Brands filed a Notice of Motion 
and Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on July 3, 2012. (ER 24).  
Jane Doe filed a Memorandum of Point and Authorities opposing the Motion, and 
Internet Brands filed a Reply. (ER 25).  The district court issued its Order Granting 
Defendant Internet Brands, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on August 16, 2012, based on the parties’ submissions 
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 8 of 35
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without oral argument. (ER 5-9).  The Order dismissed the action with prejudice on 
the grounds that it was barred by the CDA. (ER 8).  
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT  
TO THE ISSUE SUBMITTED FOR REVIEW 
 
 Internet Brands owns and operates the website modelmayhem.com, which it 
purchased in 2008.  (Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 17, ER 11, 15).2  This website is intended for 
use by the modeling industry, and provides a platform for professional and aspiring 
models to market their services. (¶ 3, ER 11).  Jane Doe was an aspiring model.  
She became a member of modelmayhem.com to market her modeling services and 
further her career in the modeling industry. (¶¶ 7-8, ER 12).  
 Unbeknownst to Jane Doe, two persons, Lavont Flanders and Emerson 
Callum, were using modelmayhem.com to lure and deceive young women with 
modelmayhem.com profiles, like Jane Doe, into a fraudulent scheme in which they 
would drug and rape the women on videotape for sale and distribution as 
pornography.  (¶ 9, ER 12, 13).  The scam was perpetrated in a common pattern, in 
which Flanders and Callum would contact a modelmayhem.com member using 
fake identities disguised as talent scouts, and lure them to the Miami, Florida area 
for a fabricated modeling audition and an opportunity for a highly desirable 
                            
2  Because this is an appeal from an order dismissing the case pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), all citations in this section are to the Complaint filed in the 
district court. (ER 10-22) 
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modeling job. (Id.)  Once at the audition, they would slip the victim a date-rape 
drug, and then Callum would rape the woman on videotape. (Id.) 
 In 2008, as set forth in the Complaint, Internet Brands purchased 
modelmayhem.com in a commercial transaction from persons identified in the 
Complaint collectively as “the Waitts”.  (ER 15). The Complaint alleges that 
Internet Brands then learned that the modelmayhem.com website was being used 
to target and victimize members in the Flanders and Callum rape scheme: 
18. Shortly after purchasing MODELMAYHEM.COM, 
INTERNET BRANDS learned of the charges against 
Flanders and Callum, and the central role played by 
MODELMAYHEM.COM in the rapes of 
MODELMAYHEM.COM members.  
  
19. In August, 2010, INTERNET BRANDS brought a claim 
against the Waitts, in Waitt v. Internet Brands, Inc., case 
no. 10-CV-3006- GHK, U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California.  In this lawsuit, 
INTERNET BRANDS asserts that the Waitts failed to 
inform INTERNET BRANDS of the potential for civil 
suits against MODELMAYHEM.COM arising from the 
actions of Lavont Flanders.  
 
20. Accordingly, on INTERNET BRANDS own admissions, 
it had actual knowledge no later than August 2010, that: 
 
a. MODELMAYHEM.COM was being used as a means of 
luring unsuspecting female MODELMAYHEM.COM 
users, like JANE DOE, to drug and rape them, 
 
b. Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum, in particular, had 
used MODELMAYHEM.COM on multiple occasions to 
lure unsuspecting women to drug, rape and videotape 
them for pornography; and  
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 10 of 35
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c. Flanders and Callum used MODELMAYHEM.COM as 
an essential element of the scheme, horrifically 
victimizing MODELMAYHEM.COM’s members. 
 
(ER 15, 16).  
 While Internet Brands sought to recover money from the Waitts because 
they failed to disclose the rape scam to Internet Brands in selling 
modelmayhem.com, it did absolutely nothing to disclose to its members the 
recurring and predictable acts of Flanders and Callum, or otherwise warn its female 
members that the fraudulent rape scheme posed a present danger to them.  (¶¶ 22-
28, ER 16-17).  Simply by sharing its knowledge with its female members, Internet 
Brands could have prevented their victimization in the fraudulent scheme.  (¶28-
39, ER 15-18).   
 Because Internet Brands did not do so, Jane Doe was completely unaware of 
the danger posed by a supposed talent scout offering a particular opportunity to 
come to Miami for an audition in February, 2011. (¶ 10, ER 13).  As a result, Jane 
Doe fell victim to the scheme: She was contacted by Flanders using a false 
identity, flew to Miami for a phony audition, and was then drugged and raped by 
Callum for a pornographic video. (¶ 11, ER 13-14).  
 The Complaint alleges that, given Internet Brands prior actual and particular 
knowledge of the perpetrators and the details of their rape scam, Internet Brands 
had a duty to make adequate disclosures and warn its members.  (¶¶ 29-34, ER 17).  
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 11 of 35
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In failing to make any warning or disclosure to its members, whom Internet Brands 
knew were vulnerable targets in the scam, it breached this duty.  (¶¶ 35-38, ER 17-
18).  As a direct and proximate cause of its negligence in failing to warn, “Jane  
Doe was an unknowing and helpless victim to the fraudulent solicitation, drugging 
and rape by Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum.” (¶ 39, ER 18).  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The CDA §230(c)(1) does not bar Jane Doe’s claim for the negligent failure 
to warn of a known and serious danger.  In particular, it does not treat Internet 
Brands as a “publisher or speaker” of third party content within the meaning or 
intent of the CDA.  The district court’s decision to the contrary stretches the 
statutory language beyond any reasonable interpretation.  Moreover, barring Jane 
Doe’s negligence claim is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s detailed analysis applying 
§230(c) in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 Jane Doe alleges a negligent failure to warn arising from Internet Brand’s 
knowledge of the rape scam perpetrated by Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum, 
in which members of Internet Brand’s website, modelmayhem.com, were targeted 
in a fraudulent scheme. They were lured to Miami for a phony audition, and then 
drugged and raped for purposes of making pornography.  This negligence claim 
does not treat Internet Brands as a “publisher or speaker” of third party content.  
Internet Brands’ status as an internet services provider publishing content from its 
members is entirely peripheral to Jane Doe’s claim that Internet Brands failed to 
warn its vulnerable members of modleymayhem.com that they were targets of a 
rape scam.  Accordingly, the CDA §230(c)(1) does not bar Jane Doe’s claim. 
 Jane Doe’s negligent failure to warn claim is otherwise entirely consistent 
with the purposes and intent of the CDA to promote unfettered speech on the 
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 13 of 35
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Internet and allow Internet service providers to self-regulate by screening and 
removing offensive content.  Jane Doe’s claim does not interfere with or otherwise 
affect free and unfettered communications on the internet.  The district court’s 
decision to bar Jane Doe’s claim under the CDA not only strays far from the 
statutory language, but loses sight of the statutory purpose and policy.  
Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) of 
Jane Doe’s negligence claim on the sole ground that it is barred under the CDA is 
error and must be reversed.  
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR  
 THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS DE NOVO 
 
 The district court granted Internet Brand’s Motion to Dismiss with prejudice 
(ER 8).  This decision to grant a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo.  Edwards 
v. Marin Park, Inc. 356 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). In conducting this review, 
the Court “accepts as true the facts as [Jane Doe] has plead them in her 
Complaint.”  Hall v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 
2007).  
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II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY  
 ACT DOES NOT BAR JANE  
 DOE’S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
 
A. Jane Doe’s Claim Does Not Treat Internet Brands as a  
 “Publisher or Speaker” Under Ninth Circuit Precedent 
 
 The district court held that Jane Doe’s negligence claim is barred by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. §230, based on the following 
language in the statute:  
(c)   Protection for good samaritan blocking and screening 
of offensive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content 
provider.  
 
47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1). While some courts have characterized this statutory 
language as providing an internet service provider with “immunity”,3  in Barnes v. 
Yahoo, Inc. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), the Court noted that the CDA §230(c) 
is not an immunity provision: “[I]t appears clear that neither this subsection 
[§230(c) of the CDA] nor any other declares a general immunity from liability 
deriving from third party content. … ‘Subsection (c)(1) does not mention 
‘immunity’ or any synym.’ ”  Id. at 1100 (quoting Chi Lawyers Comm. for Civil 
                            
3  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 
2003) (discussed infra note 5).  
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Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
 Rather, for a claim to be precluded under the CDA certain elements must be 
demonstrated:  
It appears that subsection (c)(1) only protects from 
liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer 
service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state 
law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of 
information provided by another information content 
provider.  
 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100-1101 (footnote omitted).   This test under §230(c)(1) 
typically hinges on the “publisher or speaker” element.  The Statute “precludes 
liability only by means of a definition,” i.e., whether the defendant is being treated 
as a “publisher or speaker”.  Id.; accord Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659-60 
(7th Cir. 2003).   
 In Barnes, the Court considered the “publisher or speaker” element, finding 
that the plaintiff’s claim for promissory estoppel did not treat the defendant as a 
“publisher or speaker”, and as a result, it was not barred by the CDA. 570 F.3d at 
1106-08. Applying the Court’s thorough and reasoned analysis to Jane Doe’s 
negligence claim in this case compels the conclusion that it likewise is not barred 
by the CDA.  
 The Court in Barnes first noted that the case before it “stems from a 
dangerous, cruel, and highly indecent use of the internet for the apparent purpose 
of revenge.”  Id. at 1098. The plaintiff’s former boyfriend posted a false profile of 
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plaintiff on a website run by Yahoo!, Inc.  The profile contained nude photographs 
of the plaintiff and an open solicitation to the public for sex, along with the 
plaintiff’s actual contact information and place of employment.  Id.  As a result, the 
plaintiff was “peppered” at her office with contacts from men responding to the 
solicitation for sex. Id. at 1098. The plaintiff requested removal of this content in 
accordance with Yahoo policy, but Yahoo failed to respond.  Eventually, when the 
press was prepared to report on the incident, a Yahoo official contacted the 
plaintiff and assured her that he would take action to remove the unauthorized 
profile.  The plaintiff relied on this promise and took no further action, yet two 
months passed without the profile being removed.  The plaintiff then filed suit.  Id. 
at 1099.  
 The plaintiff’s complaint in Barnes alleged two causes of action: (i) a 
“negligent undertaking” claim, arising from the services that Yahoo undertook to 
provide in removing an unauthorized profile; and (ii) a promissory estoppel claim 
based on the express promise by the Yahoo official to remove the profile and the 
plaintiff’s reliance on that promise.  Id.  The Court analyzed each of these claims 
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separately under the CDA §230(c)(1), and ultimately came to different conclusions 
for each.4 It posed the issue before the Court as follows:  
The question before us is how to determine when, for 
purposes of this statute, a plaintiff’s theory of liability 
would treat a defendant as a publisher or speaker of third-
party content.  
 
Id. at 1101. In addressing this question, the Court noted that its focus must be on 
the source of the duty alleged:  
[W]hat matters is not the name of the cause of action – 
defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction 
of emotional distress – what matters is whether the cause 
of action inherently requires the court to treat the 
defendant as the “publisher or speaker” of content 
provided by another.  To put it another way, courts must 
ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the 
defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or 
conduct as a “publisher or speaker.” If it does, section 
230(c)(1) precludes liability.  
 
Id. at 1101-02.  
 
 An internet service provider’s status as a “publisher or speaker” depends on 
its performance of particular functions:  
We have indicated that publication involves reviewing, 
editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw 
from publication third-party content. . . . Thus, a 
publisher reviews material submitted for publication, 
                            
4 The Ninth Circuit in Barnes reversed the dismissal of the district court, which had 
held that Yahoo was “‘immune’ against any liability for the content that 
[plaintiff’s] former boyfriend had posted.”  Id. at 1099.  
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perhaps edits it for style or technical fluency, and then 
decides whether to publish it.  
 
Id. at 1102.  See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 1054 
(1981) (in construing a statute, “[u]nless otherwise defined, words will be 
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning”).  Section 
230(c)(1) thus protects from liability the decisions inherent in performing these 
publishing functions: “Subsection (c)(1), by itself, shields from liability all 
publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to content 
generated entirely by third parties.”  Id. at 1105. 
 Application of this standard proved fatal to the plaintiff’s “negligent 
undertaking” theory of liability in Barnes.  The Court noted that this theory of 
liability was directed squarely at the reasonableness of Yahoo’s publishing 
decision:  
[A] plaintiff cannot sue someone for publishing third-
party content simply by changing the name of the theory 
from defamation to negligence.  Nor can he or she escape 
section 230(c) by labeling as a “negligent undertaking” 
an action that is quintessentially that of a publisher.  The 
word “undertaking,” after all, is meaningless without the 
following verb.  That is, one does not merely undertake; 
one undertakes to do something.  And what is the 
undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform 
with due care?  The removal of the indecent profiles that 
her former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s website.  But 
removing content is something the publishers do, and to 
impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily 
involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the 
content it failed to remove. In other words, the duty that 
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Barnes claims Yahoo violated derives from Yahoo’s 
conduct as a publisher – the steps it allegedly took, but 
later supposedly abandoned, to de-publish the offensive 
profiles.  
 
Id. at 1102-03 (emphasis supplied).5 
 In stark contrast, the failure to warn theory of liability in this case does not 
implicate any publishing decision.  In particular, it does not concern whether to 
edit, remove or post on the internet particular content from third parties. In stating 
a claim for negligent failure to warn, Jane Doe does not contend that access to or 
communications from third parties on modelmayhem.com should have been 
altered or restricted in any way, and her claim does not depend on any such act or 
omission.  The Complaint does not assert a cause of action in any way comparable 
to defamation or a tort in its category.6  Warning its members of a known danger 
that they are targets in a rape conspiracy is simply not “something publishers do”. 
See id.  
                            
5 In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff, 
a well-known actress, sued for invasion of privacy and related torts based on 
matchmaker.com publishing a false profile of her on its dating website. Id. at 1121-
22.  These tort claims, alleging that the publication of the false profile on the 
defendant’s website was wrongful, fall in the same category as the “negligent 
undertaking” claim that was held to be barred under §230(c) in Barnes.  The Court 
in Carafano likewise held that the defendant could not be sued for these tort claims 
under the CDA.  Id. at 122-25. 
 
6  See note 10 infra for a discussion of the torts included within the realm of 
“publishing” indicated in §230(c)(1). 
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 B.  Jane Doe’s Negligence Theory of Liability Does Not Affect Internet     
 Brand’s Status as a “Publisher or Speaker” of Third Party Content 
 
 The duty to warn alleged by Jane Doe arises in favor of one who is 
endangered by the conduct of a third party where the defendant “stands in some 
special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in 
a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct.”  Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (Cal. 1976) 
(citing Restatement 2d Torts §315).  A duty is imposed where “the category of 
negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm 
experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.”  
Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1320, 1330, 
86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 274, 282 (2009) (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 573 n. 
6, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 (1986)).  Where, as here, the parties are in a “direct and 
continuing relationship”, and individuals are “uniquely exposed” to danger, “it is 
fair to conclude that warnings given discreetly and to a limited number of persons 
would have a greater affect [then a warning to the general public] because they 
would alert those particular targeted individuals of the possibility of a specific 
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threat pointed at them.”  Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 753-55, 
167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76-78 (1980).7 
 Here, the Complaint alleges that Internet Brands had particular knowledge –  
far superior to that of its members – that Flanders and Callum were targeting 
modelmayhem.com members in a rape scam. (ER 12-13).  Internet Brands was 
sufficiently concerned about this scheme to sue the seller of the 
modelmayhem.com website for failing to disclose the acts and conduct of Flanders 
and Callum to Internet Brands in the course of pre-closing due diligence.  That suit 
was based on Internet Brands’ claim that this scheme negatively affected the value 
of its modelmayhem.com property, as it created a potential for civil suits by its 
members victimized in the scheme. (ER 15-16). At the same time, Internet Brands 
failed to warn its modelmayhem.com members that they were targeted in a 
particular manner through fraud and deceit to be drugged and raped for the 
production of pornography.  Ironically, Internet Brands had asserted its legal rights 
to be informed of the rape scheme at the same time that it kept in the dark its 
                            
7 See also Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980), 
where the Court held that wife of child molester owed duty to children when she 
invited them to swim at her home under her husband’s supervision, applying 
Restatement 2d Torts §302B which provides: “An act or an omission may be 
negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk 
of harm to another through the conduct of … a third person which is intended to 
cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal.”  Id., 112 Cal. App. 3d at 209-
10, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 284.  
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members who were in actual danger. Jane Doe was victimized in the rape scheme, 
entirely unaware of the danger posed, after Internet Brands had sued the seller of 
modelmayhem.com alleging a failure to disclose.  
 Accordingly, the liability of Internet Brands in Jane Doe’s negligence claim 
is derived from its superior knowledge of the danger presented to 
modelmayhem.com members like Jane Doe, and the foreseeability of harm 
resulting from the failure to warn them of this danger.  It does not concern the 
decision whether to edit, remove or post on the Internet particular content from 
third parties.  No such publishing decisions are implicated.  The publication of 
third party content from modelmayhem.com members is peripheral to and 
unaffected by the tort theory of liability alleged in this case.  Applying the analysis 
set forth in Barnes, the conclusion is unavoidable that Jane Doe’s negligence claim 
is not derived from its status as a “publisher of speaker”.  The district court’s 
conclusion to the contrary is therefore in error.  
 Jane Doe’s negligence claim is more comparable to the plaintiff’s 
promissory estoppel claim in Barnes.  In discussing that claim, the Court noted that 
“liability for breach of promise is different from, and not merely a rephrasing of, 
liability for negligent undertaking.  Id. at 1106.  The Court held that this promise 
fell outside the contours of §230(c)(1) as a theory of liability, even though the 
promise itself concerned the performance of a publishing task:  
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The difference is that the various torts we referred to 
above each derive liability from behavior that is identical 
to publishing or speaking: publishing defamatory 
material; publishing material that inflicts emotional 
distress; or indeed attempting to de-publish hurtful 
material but doing it badly.  To undertake a thing, within 
the meaning of the tort, is to do it.  
 
Promising is different because it is not synonymous with 
the performance of the action promised.  That is, whereas 
one cannot undertake to do something without 
simultaneously doing it, one can, and often does, promise 
to do something without actually doing it at the same 
time.  Contract liability here would come not from 
Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest 
intention to be legally obligated to do something, which 
happens to be removal of material from publication. … 
 
Subsection 230(c)(1) creates a baseline rule: no liability 
for publishing or speaking the content of other 
information service providers.  Insofar as Yahoo made a 
promise with the constructive intent that it be 
enforceable, it has implicitly agreed to an alteration in 
such baseline.  
   
Id. at 1107-09. 
 The promise in Barnes that fell beyond the scope of §230(c)(1) is 
conceptually no different from the warning omitted in the instant case. This failure 
to warn in the face of superior information posing a grave danger to 
modelmayhem.com members is not a publishing decision regarding third party 
content, nor does it implicate any such publishing decision.  It therefore is not 
barred by the CDA §230(c)(1).  
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 C.  There Is No Basis to Distinguish Barnes or Lansing 
 The limits of a claim of immunity under the CDA are further illustrated in 
Lansing v. Southwest Airlines Co., 2012 Ill. App. (1st) 101164, ___ N.E. 2d ___ 
(2012).  There, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant airline for 
negligent supervision, based on its employee threatening and harassing the plaintiff 
using “defendant’s computer, Internet and telephone facilities to send harassing 
and threatening e-mails and text messages”, after the plaintiff had notified the 
airline of its employee’s misconduct and the defendant airline failed to take steps 
to stop the alleged misconduct. Id. at *1.   The defendant asserted that the CDA 
applied to its employee’s use of the internet and emails, and that it was thus 
immune from suit under the CDA.  The Court found that the airline was the 
provider of an “interactive computer service” under §230(c)(1), but nonetheless 
held that the CDA did not bar the plaintiff’s negligence claim:  
Defendant’s interpretation of subsection 230(c)(1) 
expands its scope beyond its language.  We … read 
subsection 230(c)(1) to do exactly what it says, and what 
it says is that an ICS [Interactive Computer Service] user 
or provider like defendant must not “be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by” 
someone else. Accordingly, because subsection 230(c)(1) 
limits who may be called the publisher or speaker of 
information that appears online, it could foreclose any 
liability that depends on deeming the ICS user or 
provider a publisher or speaker, like a cause of action for 
defamation, obscenity, or copyright infringement. …  
The CDA was not enacted to be a complete shield for 
ICS users or providers against any and all state law 
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torts that involve the use of the Internet. … The CDA 
does not bar plaintiff’s cause of action simply because 
defendant’s employee used the internet access provided 
by defendant as one vehicle to harass and threaten 
plaintiff.  
 
Id. at *8 (emphasis supplied).  The Court further analyzed the particular negligence 
claim brought by the plaintiff in the context of the CDA’s language, finding that 
the duty that the defendant was alleged to have violated was unrelated to any 
“publishing or speaking” of content provided by another:   
We find that section 230(c) of the CDA does not apply to 
plaintiff’s negligent supervision cause of action because 
any issue concerning whether defendant acted like a 
publisher or speaker of the offensive material is 
irrelevant to plaintiff’s pled claim.  Plaintiff’s negligent 
supervision cause of action does not require publishing 
or speaking as a critical element, and holding defendant 
liable for its failure to supervise its employee after 
defendant had received notice of the employee’s 
wrongful conduct does not treat defendant as if it were 
the publisher or speaker of the alleged e-mails and texts. 
…  
Here, the duty that plaintiff alleges defendant has 
violated is derived from defendant’s duty to supervise 
McGrew’s conduct as an employee of defendant.  
Defendant’s duty to supervise its employee is distinct 
from any conduct like editing, monitoring or removing 
offensive content published on the Internet. … 
Clearly, the duty plaintiff alleges defendant violated is 
not derived from any behavior by defendant that is 
similar to publishing or speaking.  
 
Id. at *9 (relying upon, among other authorities, Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02) 
(emphasis supplied). See also F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc., 2007 WL 4356786 *5 (D. 
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Wyo. 2007) (in unfair trade practices claim against website for misappropriating 
confidential phone records, Court held that §230(c) bar did not apply, noting that 
the claim “does not sound in defamation”). 
 As in Lansing, Internet Brand’s duty to warn Jane Doe “is distinct from any 
conduct like editing, monitoring or removing offensive content published on the 
Internet.”  Id.  The duty to warn alleged by Jane Doe “does not require publishing 
or speaking as a critical element”, and “is not derived from any behavior by 
defendant that is similar to publishing or speaking.” Id.  Jane Doe’s negligent 
failure to warn claim therefore falls outside the scope of §230(c)(1). 
 The district court attempted to distinguish Lansing on the basis that the 
defendant’s duty in that case “derived from the defendant’s status as an employer.”  
(ER 8).  As a result of this status, “the defendant had a duty to supervise its 
employee’s conduct.” (Id.)  On this same basis, the district court asserted that 
Barnes is distinguishable because the defendant’s duty “derived from an 
enforceable promise that the defendant had breached.” (Id.)  The district court 
failed to recognize, however, that, as in Lansing and Barnes, Internet Brands’ 
common law duty is not dependent on its status as a “publisher” of content from 
others.  The district court’s conclusion to the contrary does not withstand scrutiny.  
Internet Brands had a common law duty to warn its users and customers of a 
known risk irrespective of its role as a publisher of third party content.  Internet 
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Brands was in a special position of superior knowledge of a danger posed 
particularly to its customers.  Its duty in this case derives from this relationship and 
superior knowledge, not from its role as a “publisher or speaker”. As in Lansing 
and Barnes, Internet Brand’s status as publisher of third party content is not 
proximately connected to the breach of the common law duty alleged in the 
Complaint.  There is no basis in reason to distinguish the duty alleged in Barnes 
and Lansing from the duty alleged here as it concerns whether the defendant is 
being treated as a “publisher or speaker.” 
III. CASES IN WHICH CLAIMS WERE BARRED  
 UNDER THE CDA §230(c) ARE DISTINGUISHABLE 
 
  The torts alleged in the cases relied upon by the district court are readily 
distinguishable from the failure to warn alleged in this case.  See Julie Doe II v. 
MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148 (2009) (“Doe II”), and 
Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Doe v. MySpace”) 
(discussed by district court at ER 7-8).  Doe II and Doe v. MySpace involved 
essentially identical claims and reached the same result, barring suit under the 
CDA.  In both cases, claims were brought against Myspace on behalf of minors 
who were sexually assaulted by persons whom they met through Myspace’s web-
based social network.  Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 565, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 150-51; 
Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 416.  The plaintiffs in those cases alleged in their 
complaints that MySpace was liable for failing to implement measures to prevent 
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minors from communicating with strangers on its website. Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 
4th at 569, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 153-54; Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420.  In Doe 
II, the plaintiffs alleged “that MySpace should have implemented readily available 
and practicable age-verification software or set the default security setting on the 
Julie Does’ accounts to ‘private’”.  175 Cal. App. 4th at 565, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
151.  The plaintiff argued in both cases that the CDA did not apply because their 
claims for failure to implement safety measures did not treat MySpace as a 
“publisher”.  The courts rejected this argument, finding that the allegation of a 
failure to implement safety measures was a thinly veiled attempt to challenge 
MySpace’s website content:  
The appellants characterize their complaint as one for 
failure to adopt reasonable safety measures does not 
avoid the immunity granted by section 230.  It is 
undeniable that appellants seek to hold MySpace 
responsible for the communications between the Julie 
Does and their assailants.  At its core, appellants want 
MySpace to regulate what appears on its Web site. … 
That type of activity – to restrict or make available 
certain material – is expressly covered by section 230.  
 
Doe II, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 573; 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 156-57; accord Doe v. 
MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420 (finding that the plaintiffs’ “allegations are merely 
another way of claiming that Myspace was liable for publishing the 
communications and they speak to Myspace’s role as a publisher of online third-
party-generated content”).  
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 29 of 35
 25 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 Here, Jane Doe does not claim that Internet Brands was negligent for failing 
to restrict or limit communications on its website.  Rather, Plaintiff alleges that 
Internet Brands failed to warn its vulnerable members of a known danger of rape 
particular to those members.  Unlike Doe II and Doe v. MySpace, Jane Doe’s 
Complaint has nothing to do with communications or content that Internet Brands 
may or may not have allowed or “published” on its modelmayhem.com website.  
Rather, Internet Brands was in a unique position to warn its members of the rape 
scam and prevent harm.  This duty to warn is separate and distinct from Internet 
Brands’ role as a “publisher” of third party content.   
 In Doe II, the Court summarized the issue as follows:  
The real question, though, is whether appellants seek to 
hold MySpace liable for failing to exercise a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions, namely deciding whether 
to publish certain material or not.  Because they do, 
section 230 immunizes MySpace from liability.  
 
175 Cal. App. 4th at 573, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 157.  As discussed above, Jane Doe 
does not seek to hold Internet Brands liable for “deciding whether to publish 
certain material [from another content provider] or not.”  Her claim, consistent 
with Doe II and Doe v. MySpace, falls outside the scope of the CDA §230(c)(1).  
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IV. THE TORT CLAIM BROUGHT BY JANE  
 DOE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CDA 
 
 Aside from the tort claim of Jane Doe not treating Internet Brands as a 
“publisher or speaker”, it is consistent with the purpose and policy of 47 U.S.C. 
§230.  Section 230(e)(3) of the CDA provides that  
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any 
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with 
this section.  No cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that 
is inconsistent with this section.  
 
One of the objectives of the CDA is to promote the “vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the internet. …” 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2). In barring 
inconsistent state law and regulation, “Section 230 represents the approach of 
Congress to a problem of national and international dimension.”  Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333-334 (4th Cir. 1997).  Toward this end, the CDA 
seeks to provide protection to private blocking and screening of offensive material 
on the Internet:8  
                            
8  The bar of Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA on claims treating an internet service 
provider as a “publisher or speaker” must be read in tandem with Section 
230(c)(2), which bars claims against an “interactive computer service” that acts to 
restrict access to or censor content it in good faith “considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2). 
This “safe harbor” was designed to further the legislative goal of protecting the 
private blocking and screening of offensive material.  See Lukmire, Can the Courts 
Tame The Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. 
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Section 230 was prompted by a state court case holding 
Prodigy responsible for a libelous message posted on one 
of its financial message boards. See Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct May 24, 2995) (unpublished).  The court there found 
that Prodigy had become a “publisher” under state law 
because it voluntarily deleted some messages from its 
message boards “on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad 
taste,’ ” and was therefore legally responsible for the 
content of defamatory messages that it failed to delete. . . 
. Under the reasoning of Stratton Oakmont, online 
service providers that voluntarily filter some messages 
become liable for all messages transmitted, whereas 
providers that bury their heads in the sand and ignore 
problematic posts altogether escape liability.  
 
Fair Hearing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008).  The legislative intent of the CDA §230(c) was thus, in 
part, to allow an internet service provider to edit or not edit content from third 
parties without exposing itself to liability as a result:9  
In passing section 230, Congress sought to spare 
interactive computer services this grim choice by 
allowing them to perform some editing on user-generated 
content without thereby becoming liable for all 
                                                                                        
America Online, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 371, 388-89 (2010) (discussed 
infra).   
 
9  “The starting point for interpretation of a statute is the language of the statute 
itself.”  U.S. v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 564-65 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).  
Where this language is ambiguous or not dispositive, “we look to the legislative 
intent revealed in the history and purpose of the statutory scheme.” Id. As 
discussed infra, neither the language of the statute, “treatment of publisher or 
speaker,” nor its legislative history and purpose support the barring of Jane Doe’s 
negligence claim in this case.  
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defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they 
didn’t edit of delete. In other words, Congress sought to 
immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the 
creation of content[.] 
 
Id. (emphasis original).  
See also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that §230(c) 
protects a “web host that does filter out offensive material,” and “also blocks civil 
liability when web hosts and other Internet service providers … refrain from 
filtering or censoring the information on their sites”) (emphasis original). 
 Moreover, the CDA §230 has been expansively interpreted since its 
enactment in 1996, and its application to bar causes of action outside of defamation 
and related torts marks the furthest extent of its reach.  See Lukmire, Can the 
Courts Tame The Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. 
America Online, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 371 (2010).  The principal 
legislative purpose in the enactment of Section 230 was to curb the transmission of 
indecent material on the Internet which could be viewed by children.  Id. at 375. 
“The statute has grown into a ‘judicial oak’, with impacts far beyond its language 
sounding in defamation law and its original intent to prevent the nascent Internet 
from becoming a ‘red light district.’ ”10  Id. at 372.  The district court’s application 
                            
10 While the Court’s interpretation of the bar of §230(c) was expansive in Zeran v. 
American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), its reach only included within 
the “publisher or speaker” language a limited range of torts:  
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of the CDA §230 to bar Jane Doe’s negligence claim “crosses the line” from 
liberal statutory interpretation into territory entirely unmoored by statutory 
language and legislative history.  Internet Brands’ treatment of third party content 
is collateral and tangential to Jane Doe’s claim, such that to bar this claim is to take 
§230(c)(1) into the realm of complete immunity rejected by the Court in Barnes. 
570 F.3d at 1101-09.  
 Jane Doe’s negligent failure to warn cause of action does not compel, nor 
implicate in any way, the filtering or censoring of information or content from 
third parties on modelmayhem.com.  Flanders and Callum are not alleged to be 
responsible for any content on modelmayhem.com.  It is not alleged that Internet 
Brands should have engaged in any filtering or censoring of content from third 
parties.  This negligence claim does not impede, interfere with or otherwise touch 
on the promotion of unfettered speech on the Internet. Rather, Plaintiff’s claim 
seeks to hold Internet Brands liable for its failure to warn of a known danger.  
                                                                                        
 
The Zeran court, interpreting section 230 in light of free-
speech and Internet-development concerns, likely 
construed the statute to include a grant of immunity 
against those publication-based torts – false light 
invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress – 
that are sometimes treated as “cousins” of defamation 
law because the harms suffered are analogous and 
because they also implicate speech interests. 
 
Lukmire, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am.L. at 396.   
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Nothing about Plaintiff’s claim affects third party content, and thus §230(c) does 
not come into play.  Accordingly, Jane Doe’s cause of action should not have been 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
 Based on the foregoing, Jane Doe respectfully requests that the district 
court’s dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) be reversed, and this case 
remanded for further proceedings.  
By:  s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein   
Jeffrey Herman 
Stuart S. Mermelstein 
HERMAN LAW 
Attorneys for Jane Doe No. 14 
3351 NW Boca Raton Boulevard 
Boca Raton, FL 33431 
Tel: 305-931-2200 
Fax: 561-395-0910 
 
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 
 
 Pursuant to 9th Cir.R. 28-2.6, Appellant’s counsel states that he is unaware 
of any related case pending in this Court. 
                 s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein    
       Stuart S. Mermelstein 
 
 
  Case: 12-56638, 02/13/2013, ID: 8512329, DktEntry: 8-2, Page 35 of 35
